

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12646

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E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: US PLENARY STATEMENT,
AUGUST 18, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO.309

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED AT PLENARY
BY DR. GERALD JOHNSON, US DELEGATION, ON AUGUST 18.

BEGIN TEXT: SPEAKING FOR THE US DELEGATION, MAY I
EXPRESS OUR THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN ARRANGING, ON
VERY SHORT NOTICE, THE BRIEF WORKING RECESS THAT WE
SUGGESTED. I WILL NOT SPECULATE ON HOW OUR NEGOTIATING
PARTNERS WILL USE THE TIME DURING THE NEXT THREE WEEKS,
BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT WE WILL SEE THE BENEFICIAL RESULTS
WHEN WE RESUME OUR WORK. AS FOR US, I CAN ASSURE YOU
THAT THIS INTERVAL FOR CONSULTATIONS AT HOME WILL BE
EXTREMELY HELPFUL.

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THIS PLENARY DOES NOT MARK THE COMPLETION OF A PHASE
IN OUR NEGOTIATION BUT ONLY A BRIEF INTERRUPTION IN OUR
MEETING SCHEDULE. THEREFORE, I DO NOT INTEND TO MAKE A
. GENERAL STATEMENT ABOUT OUR PROGRESS NOR TO REVIEW ALL
OUTSTANDING ISSUES. AT OUR LAST MEETING CHAIRMAN
PETROSYANTS MADE SEVERAL IMPORTANT STATEMENTS ABOUT
NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS WHICH CALL FOR FURTHER DIS-

CUSSION, AND WE PLAN TO RETURN TO THAT SUBJECT AFTER THE RECESS. TODAY, HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO CONFINE MY REMARKS TO ANOTHER IMPORTANT ASPECT OF OUR CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY THE QUESTION OF OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE WORK OF THE OSI TECHNICAL GROUP IS ENTERING A CRUCIAL PHASE WHERE FURTHER PROGRESS DEPENDS ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN KEY ISSUES. IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS IF I REVIEW THOSE ISSUES BRIEFLY AND EXPLAIN HOW THEY RELATE TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE US APPROACH.

THE PROBLEM IN THE OSI NEGOTIATION, AS WE SEE IT, IS NOT HOW MUCH OR HOW LITTLE DETAIL THERE SHOULD BE IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT OR THE ANNEX, THOUGH WE OF COURSE AGREE THAT THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL SHOULD NOT BE IN EXCESS OF OUR MUTUAL NEEDS. THE PROBLEM FACING US IS HOW TO SET FORTH THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE OSI PROCESS IN SUFFICIENT DETAIL AND CLARITY SO THAT THESE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO CONFIDENCE IN THE TREATY. THIS CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY AGREEING TO SETTLE THE CONDITIONS OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AFTER THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE. ONLY CLEAR AND WORKABLE OSI PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENT, WHICH ASSURE CERTAIN RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS TO THE REQUESTING PARTY, WILL CREATE CONFIDENCE IN THE TREATY.

THE ISSUES I PROPOSE TO COMMENT ON TODAY ARE: THE
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QUESTION OF JOINT PARTICIPATION IN OSIS; BASIC EQUIPMENT; AND POSITION-FIXING. A FOURTH ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO US, WHICH I DO NOT PROPOSE TO DISCUSS TODAY, IS THE AGREED UNDERSTANDING ON ON-SITE INSPECTION REQUESTS. I WOULD MERELY RECALL THAT WE WILL WANT TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING ALONG THE LINES OF THE ONE WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED. AS WE HAVE INDICATED ON PAST OCCASIONS, WE REGARD SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS.

OUR APPROACH TO THE ISSUES I MENTIONED -- THE QUESTION OF JOINT PARTICIPATION, BASIC EQUIPMENT, AND POSITION-FIXING -- IS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT OSI ARRANGEMENTS MUST HAVE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY AS A PROCESS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS. THE PARTIES INVOLVED -- AND PARTICULARLY THE REQUESTING PARTY -- MUST PERCEIVE THE OSI PROCESS AS PRODUCING AN OBJECTIVE, RELIABLE REPORT. OTHERWISE THE OSI CANNOT SERVE ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE OF REASSURING THE REQUESTING PARTY THAT THE TREATY IS BEING COMPLIED WITH. IT IS NOT MERELY A QUESTION FOR US OF REASSURING PUBLIC OPINION, ALTHOUGH THAT IS PART OF THE

STORY. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THE OSI MUST ABOVE ALL REASSURE OUR GOVERNMENT -- AS WELL AS INFORMED PUBLIC OPINION INCLUDING THE PRESS, MUCH OF WHICH MAY BE INITIALLY SKEPTICAL OF THE OSI PROCESS. A REPORT THAT AN ON-SITE INSPECTION HAS UNCOVERED NO EVIDENCE OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION WOULD BE REASSURING TO OUR AUTHORITIES AND PUBLIC ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE OSI PROCESS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AS RELIABLE AND CAN STAND UP UNDER SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE SCRUTINY.

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THE DAMAGING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF THE OSI OF JOINT PARTICIPATION BY THE HOST PARTY AND REQUESTING PARTY WOULD SEEM OBVIOUS. A JOINT ANALYSIS OF DATA, OR A REQUIREMENT THAT DATA PRESENTED BY THE HOST PARTY MUST BE REFLECTED IN THE ANALYSIS, WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO DOUBTS ABOUT THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE OSI. THE AMBIGUITY THAT OCCASIONED THE OSI WOULD REMAIN UNRESOLVED IN THE MINDS OF MANY, SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WOULD DOUBT THE INTEGRITY OF THE OSI PROCESS.

THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE OSI PROCESS REQUIRE THAT BASIC EQUIPMENT -- DEFINED AS EQUIPMENT THAT IS NECESSARY TO DETECT EVIDENCE OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION-- WILL BE AVAILABLE TO DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WITHOUT FURTHER NEGOTIATION, ONCE AN OSI HAS BEEN AGREED. IF IT WERE NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE AND AGREE ON A LIST OF SUCH EQUIPMENT AFTER THE TREATY IS IN FORCE, OR AFTER AN OSI HAS BEEN REQUESTED, THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ENTIRE OSI PROCESS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD LEAD TO DELAY AND TO UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE CONTEN-

TION. EVEN THE MERE POSSIBILITY THAT DESIGNATED PERSONNEL
MIGHT BE DENIED THE USE OF CERTAIN NECESSARY EQUIPMENT
WOULD IMPAIR CONFIDENCE IN THE OSI; AND IF AN OSI WERE EVER
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CONDUCTED ON THAT BASIS, THE RESULTS COULD ONLY BE ADVERSE
TO THE TREATY. ANY ARRANGEMENT THAT ENVISAGED NEGOTIATIONS
ON BASIC EQUIPMENT AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY
WOULD NOT, IN OUR VIEW, BE CONDUCTIVE TO THE BUSINESS-LIKE
COOPERATION ON OSIS SUCH AS WE FAVOR, AND AS WE BELIEVE
OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS FAVOR ALSO.

FOR MANY MONTHS A PREMISE OF OUR NEGOTIATION, WHICH WE
BELIEVED WAS ACCEPTED BY ALL SIDES, WAS THAT CERTAIN TYPES
OF BASIC EQUIPMENT WOULD BE AGREED UPON IN ADVANCE, AND
WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO LATER NEGOTIATION. WE URGE THE
SOVIET DELEGATION TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE ON THAT PREMISE.

FINALLY, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF POSITION-FIXING.
ALTHOUGH WE FULLY AGREE THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE HOST
PARTY MUST BE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED, WE BELIEVE THAT IT
IS IMPORTANT TO AGREE ON THE METHOD, OR METHODS, OF
POSITION-FIXING THAT WILL BE USED IN OSIS AND TO RECORD
OUR UNDERSTANDING IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT OR ANNEX. IF
THIS IS NOT DONE, THE AGREEMENT WILL BE OPEN TO THE
CRITICISM THAT THE DESIGNATED PERSONNEL CANNOT BE SURE
THAT THEY HAVE REACHED THE AGREED AREA, OR THAT THEY HAVE
INSPECTED THE ENTIRE AREA.

I WISH TO STRESS THAT WE DO NOT APPROACH THIS SUBJECT
OF POSITION-FIXING RIGIDLY OR DOGMATICALLY. WE BELIEVE
A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND. BUT TO FIND
THAT SOLUTION WE NEED FIRST TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT. HAVING
DONE THAT, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT A PROVISION IN
THE AGREEMENT FOR A METHOD OR METHODS THAT WOULD ENABLE
DESIGNATED PERSONNEL TO CONFIRM THAT THEY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT
TO THE AGREED INSPECTION AREA AND TO ORIENT THEMSELVES
WITHIN THAT AREA.

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WE LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING OUR WORK ON THESE ISSUES,
AS WELL AS THE OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS BEFORE US, WHEN
WE RECONVENE. END TEXT. JOHNSON

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